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We use a global competition model of international trade to characterize the eﬀects of
trade reforms occurred in Chile at the end of the 70s. We calibrate the model and evaluate
its results using a comprehensive plant-level dataset for the period 1979-96. The model is
able to explain many of the eﬀects of liberalization reforms on industry performance. We
proceed by exploring the impact of preferential trade agreements negotiated by Chile in
recent years with the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
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In the late 1970s Chile’s economy faced a number of economic reforms aimed at increasing
growth and eﬃciency. Among these economic reforms, numerous studies have highlighted
trade reforms as pre-eminent. Previous to this period, Chile had pursued a policy of import-
substitution aimed at protecting local ﬁrms from international competition. This situation
changed when the government removed non-tariﬀ restrictions and drastically reduced tariﬀ
rates.
Many studies have already explored the eﬀects of trade reforms on industry performance
in Chile and in other developing countries. In an inﬂuential volume Roberts and Tybout
(1996) organized a collection of papers describing the response of heterogenous producers to
several policy conditions. The strength of these papers is that they based their conclusions
on very detailed micro-level datasets. A common result is that trade reforms lead factors
to reallocate toward more productive plants. Pavnick (2002), using a shorter version of the
plant-level dataset used here, found evidence that within plant productivity improvement can
be attributed to liberalized trade for plants belonging to the import-competing sector.
Recently, Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) (BEJK thereafter)
have shown how trade opening has sector-speciﬁce ﬀects, creating new markets for more
productive ﬁrms and putting pressure on less productive ones. A distinctive feature of this
line of research is that it analyzed changes in the structure of the industry from a general
equilibrium prospective. Most of the previous studies concentrated on the eﬀect of policy
changes in partial equilibrium, viewing how changes in local policy aﬀect outcomes treating
prices and competition as unchanged.
In this paper we attempt to explain some stylized facts of Chile’s reform by using a
global competition model. The model is based on the work of BEJK, which features interna-
tional competition of several countries in a Ricardian environment. Using a comprehensive
plant-level dataset for the period 1979-1996, we explore the eﬀects of reducing trade barriers
simulating the policy scenario prevalent in Chile, a small developing country, in the late 70s.
We explore to what extent we can account for several facts in the data. The model quite
successfully captures the main changes happening in the manufacturing sector right after the
trade reforms: an increase in overall productivity and its components (change in produc-
tivity of continuing plants, reallocation of inputs, exiting and entrant plants), dynamics of
entry/exit of plants, relative productivity of exiting plants and changes in employment.
2Since the model comes to terms with plant-level facts quite well we go on to explore the
ﬂexibility of the calibrated model to study the eﬀect of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs
hereafter) on the performance of the manufacturing sector in Chile. From the beginning of
2000 Chile has pursued a strategy of additive regionalism negotiating PTAs with its main
trading partners. Since Viner (1950) the theories of PTAs or Custom Unions have identiﬁed
potential beneﬁts and costs for the home country and the world. It has been argued that
the welfare eﬀects of regional trade agreements are ambiguous at the theoretical level. As an
example, Wonnacott (1986) and others have argued that if PTAs are signed among natural
trade partners, then the trade creation eﬀect will outweigh the trade diversion eﬀect.
The BEJK global competition model is especially suited to evaluate the eﬀects of a PTA.
We use the model calibrated for Chile to evaluate the eﬀect of recent trade agreements with
NAFTA and the European Union. We ﬁnd evidence of potential large beneﬁts for Chile of
negotiating PTAs with its main trading partners. Our estimates for a bilateral reduction in
tariﬀs with NAFTA and the European Union leads to an increase in measured productivity
of 15 percent with a net employment creation of 28 percent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we lay out the
main stylized facts of trade reforms, industry dynamics, and exporters’ characteristics. In
Section 3, we present the theoretical model upon which we based the analysis. Section 4
compares the model quantitative implications for the trade reforms of the end of the 70s with
the plant-level statistics and present the model quantitative predictions for the preferential
trade agreements scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
2 Industry Facts
In this section we present stylized facts concerning the eﬀects of trade liberalization reforms
at the end of the 70s on the manufacturing sector. We also show some facts related to the
productivity advantage of exporters, which will be important for the implementation of the
model.
2.1 Trade Liberalizations and Industry Structure
Before 1974 the Chilean manufacturing sector was highly protected: high and diﬀerenti-
ated tariﬀs rates, quotas, multiple exchange rates and domestic regulations were favoring
the manufacturing sector at the expense of agriculture and import-competing producers over
3exporters.1 Between 1974 and 1979 Chile underwent a series of macroeconomic and micro-
economic reforms aimed at reducing the ﬁscal deﬁcit and the inﬂation rate, deregulating the
domestic market and opening the country to international trade. The reduction in trade
protection evolved in several stages: the average (unweighted) tariﬀ rate decreased from 105
percent in 1973 to 65 percent in 1975; a new target structure of eﬀective tariﬀ rates ranging
from 10 percent to 35 percent was achieved and started to have eﬀect at the end of 1977; by
June 1979 a uniform 10 percent nominal tariﬀ rate was in eﬀect. Table 1 reports the eﬀective
protection rates by three-digit sectors after 1974.
The eﬀects of trade opening on the industrial sector were substantial. We study them by
using a plant-level dataset, the Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual (ENIA) conducted an-
nually by the Chilean government statistical oﬃce (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE)).
This is an unbalanced panel dataset covering all Chilean manufacturing plants with ten or
more workers. The dataset extends from 1979 to 1996, includes information on approximately
11,000 plants altogether, with about 4,800 plants per year. It contains detailed information
on production, value added, sales, employment and wages (both white-collar and blue-collar),
exports, investment, depreciation, energy consumption, balance sheet information and other
plant characteristics. Data on plant-level exports were only collected after 1990. We start by
looking at the dynamics of plants entry and exit.2
Before turning to the analysis of the dynamics of entry and exit we need to discuss a
feature of the data: due to truncation when we have, for a given year, a missing plant we
cannot say, at least through direct information, if this plant has closed (at least temporarily)
has not reported to the statistical oﬃce or has reduced the number of employees to under ten.
This is due to the design of the survey which was originally conceived as a cross section and
was only later transformed into a panel by using plant identiﬁcation codes and SIC industrial
codes. In order to deal with this feature of the data we adopt a conservative strategy and
consider, in this section, only those plants that belong to one of the following three categories:
surviving plants (plants which stay in the sample for the entire 1979-1996 period), entering
plants (enter the database sometime between 1980 and 1996 and stay in until the end of the
period), exiting plants (enter the database in 1979 and exit sometime, without entering again,
1See Aedo and Lagos (1984), Corbo and Sanchez (1985) and Tybout (1996).
2Unfortunately, the data do not allow identiﬁcation of multi-plants ﬁrms. Indirect evidence (positive pur-
chases of material from other establishments within the same ﬁrm) shows that about 90% of the manufacturing
ﬁrms are single-plant. We will conduct our analysis focusing on plants only.
4between 1980 and 1996).3 All the other plants (which enter and exit multiple times) are not
considered in the entry/exit analysis: this reduces the number of plants in the dataset by
about 30 percent to a total of 7,624 plants. Moreover, about 11 percent of the remaining
plants switch 3-digits industry code at some point during the period over which they are
observed. We do not consider these plants either. Overall, we drop 37 percent of the plants
which account for 22 percent of total output. Figure 1 shows the original number of plants in
the survey, the number of plants dropped at each stage and the number of plants in the ﬁnal
sample from 1979 to 1996. The elimination strategy does not aﬀect the pattern of entry and
exit observed in the data since the number of plants dropped per year is fairly constant.4
Figure 2 shows the number of entering, exiting and surviving plants in the manufacturing
sector from 1979 to 1996. The number of operating plants follows a dramatic U-like pattern
whose turning point is in 1986, when the number of operating plants is 56 percent the number
of plants which were active in 1979, seven years earlier. This pattern is the result of a steady
decrease in the number of exiting plants and an increasing number of entering plants.
This pattern might suggest a strong adjustment in the industry. However, a closer look
at the dynamics in terms of size reveals a somewhat diﬀerent picture. Entrants tend to be
smaller, in terms of value of production, than existing producers. In particular, an entrant
produces 27.5 percent of the average output level of all incumbent plants in the industry (see
Table 2). On average, the entrants in each year are responsible for approximately 1.4 percent
of each manufacturing industry‘s output, this share increasing over the sample period. The
exit variables reﬂect a similar pattern: the average size of plants exiting the market is about
25 percent the size of nonexiting plants; the average market share of all exiting plants is
1.3 percent, with a decreasing pattern over time.5 If we look at size in terms of number of
workers, the size of the average entering and exiting plant is still smaller than their respective
counterparts but the diﬀerence is consistently smaller: an entrant’s and exiters’ labor force is
half as large as the labor force of an incumbent (or nonexiting) plant.
3Liu (1993) adopts the same strategy using ENIA data for the 1979-1986 period.
4We performed a robustness check using a sample which includes also plants that entered after 1979,
reported information for x consecutives years (x ≥ 1) and exited before 1996. The number of plants considered
increase by 11% on average and all the results in the paper don’t change signiﬁcantly.
5Dunne et al. (1988) compute this set of entry/exit statistics using data for U.S. ﬁrms for the period
1962-82. Like us, they ﬁnd that entering and exiting ﬁrms are substantially smaller than incumbent and
nonexiting ﬁrms, respectively. However, for U.S. data, entering and exiting ﬁrms are responsible for a larger
share (about 15%) of the manufacturing industry output and entry and exit rates are fairly stable over time.
52.2 Exporters Productivity Advantage
We now turn to the comparison of exporting and non-exporting plants. Recall that this infor-
mation will be used to calibrate the model to the data. One out of ﬁve Chilean manufacturing
plants exports part of their output. Among these, almost ﬁve out of ten export less than 10
percent of their total production and only slightly more than two out of ten export more
than half of their output . These ratios are quite stable over the years for which we have ex-
port information, from 1990 to 1996. BEJK using data for the U.S. and Eaton, Kortum and
Kramarz (2004) using French data, also conclude that there is a high degree of heterogeneity
across ﬁrms in the extent of their export participation. Figure 3 compares the productivity,
measured as value added per worker, of exporting and non-exporting plants. The distribution
of exporters productivity is shifted to the right with respect to the productivity distribution of
non-exporting plants. Exporting plants are, on average, more productive than non-exporting
plants: value added per worker at the average exporting Chilean plant is 85 percent higher
than at the average plant that does not export. This result surpasses previous ﬁndings for
U.S. and French data: BEJK show that the productivity advantage of U.S. plants is about
33 percent overall and 15 percent relative to nonexporters within the same 4-digits industry
while Eaton et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the French exporting ﬁrms’ value added per worker is 12.5
percent higher than nonexporting counterparts.
3 A Model of Global Competition
Our main objective in this study is to explain several facts related to the manufacturing sector
in Chile. BEJK (2003)’s model provides a useful framework to study the eﬀects of falling trade
barriers on the structure and performance of the manufacturing industry. We calibrate the
model to ﬁt plant-level data from ENIA for 1992. Then we use the model to observe to what
extent it captures the impact of trade reforms at the end of the 70s. Additionally, we ask
what the model can say about the eﬀects of signing PTAs with foreign countries. This section
outlines brieﬂy the global competition model stating the most important assumptions and
predictions of the framework in relation to our analysis. We then present how we take the
model to the data.
63.1 The BEJK framework
There are N countries which trade a continuum of goods indexed by j on the unit interval. In
each country consumers have CES preferences over this bundle of goods. Therefore, consumer







where Pn(j) is the price of good j in country n, xn is aggregate expenditure in country n,
σ>0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods and pn, the aggregated price index for the






On the production side, heterogeneity is driven by diﬀerences in underlying eﬃciency
across plants. In each country there are multiple potential producers of each good j with
diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency. The kth most eﬃcient producer of good j in country i hires
1/Zk
i (j) units of a unique composite input to produce one unit of the good. Each plant
produces only one type of good, there are no ﬁxed costs and technology has constant returns
to scale. Each plant is a potential candidate to provide the good to the domestic market and
eventually to export it to any other country. The kth most eﬃcient producer of good j in






where wi is the unit cost of the composite input (which varies across countries), dni ≥ 1
is the number of units that need to be shipped from country i for one unit to be delivered
in country n. Geographic barriers, represented by the parameter dni, satisfy a triangular
inequality constraint which assures that the cost of moving goods from country i to country
n is bounded from above by the cost of moving them via some third country k.I ti sw o r t h
noting that factor costs and eﬃciency aﬀect the potential exporting plant in the same way
independently of the destination. The only factor that relates the source and the destination
countries is the trade barrier parameter dni.
In each country n,e a c hg o o dj is provided by one and only one plant which proves to
b et h el o w e s tc o s tp r o v i d e ro ft h a tg o o dt oc o u n t r yn. The unit cost of the minimum cost
7provider to market n is
C1






In order to explain heterogeneity inp l a n t sm e a s u r e dp r o d u c t i v i t y ,d e ﬁned as the value of
output per unit input, Bertrand competition is introduced. Bertrand competition prevents
the lowest cost provider from raising its price over the second-lowest unit cost supplier to the














where Pn(j) is the price charged by the lowest-cost plant, C2
n(j) is the unit cost of the second-
lowest cost provider to market n and m is the upper bound on the markup as in Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977).6 Comparisons of measured productivity across plants reﬂect only diﬀerences in their
markups. The model implies that, on average, plants that are more eﬃcient charge a higher
markup, hence variation in eﬃciency can generate heterogeneity in measured productivity
across plants. The model also implies that more eﬃcient plants are more likely to export and
to have higher domestic sales than plants that don’t export.
In order to apply the model to the data we do not actually need to estimate the highest
eﬃciency Z1
i (j) and the next highest eﬃciency Z2
i (j) for each country i and good j.W ec a n
treat eﬃciency levels as random variables and transform the lowest unit cost function of good









i (j) are random variables drawn, independently across countries i and goods j,f r o ma
parameter-free distribution, Ti is a parameter that represents the overall eﬃciency of country
i and θ is a parameter that governs the heterogeneity of eﬃciency and thus determines the
scope for gains from trade due to comparative advantages.7 Moreover, as BEJK show, bilateral
trade shares πni and absorption xn summarize all we need to know about each country-speciﬁc
parameter Ti, wi and dni.
The model is simulated J times. For each market i and good j let Ωi(j) be the set of
countries which buy good j from country i. In our simulation we treat each j for which Ωi(j)
6Notice that the second-lowest cost provider to market n can either be the minimum cost provider (to
market n) from country i 6= i∗ or the second-lowest cost provider (to market n) from country i∗.
7The cdfs of the parameter-free distributions are: Pr[U1
i ≤ u1]=1− e−u1 and Pr[U2
i ≤ u2|U1
i = u1]=
1 − e−u2+u1 respectively. Since Uk
i (j)=TiZk
i (j)−θ It can be shown that Z1
i (j) and Z2
i (j) are jointly drawn
from a bivariate version of the Fréchet distribution.
8is nonempty as a product with a corresponding active plant in country i.8 For each active
plant it is possible to calculate: i) total sales, ii) whether the plant exports and how much,
iii) total production cost, iv) employment and v) total productivity.
3.2 General Equilibrium and Scenarios
The model described above represents the situation before the trade shocks. In this section we
explain how the model relates changes in trade barriers to changes in the price of intermediates.
As a preliminary step, we need to specify in more detail the nature of the unique composite
input: we assume that production combines labor, with wage Wi, and intermediates, which
are a representative bundle of manufactures with price index pi so that the cost of an input






(where labor units are chosen to eliminate the constant).
In each country i, the manufacturing sector faces an elastic supply of labor at wage Wi,
the latter being determined in the market of a tradeable nonmanufactured good which serves
as numeraire. A change in trade barriers aﬀects trade patterns by modifying producers’ cost
of exporting their goods. This, in turn, inﬂuences the price of intermediate goods in the
receiving countries, the choice between diﬀerent factors of production and the corresponding
industry equilibrium.
For each wage, the price index of manufacturing goods, pn, is determined by the trade in












We are interested in how changes in dni (trade shocks) determine changes in the price of
intermediates. In appendix A it is shown that totally diﬀerentiating equation (1) with respect
to dni and pn we obtain in matrix notation
dlogP =[ In − (1 − β)Π]
−1 diag(ΠD0)
where P is an N ×N matrix whose typical element is Pn, Π is an N ×N matrix whose typical
element πni is the fraction of goods country n buys from country i, D is a matrix with the nth
8Notice that if the set Ωi(j) is a singleton then Ωi(j)={i}. This is a consequence of the triangular
inequality constraint on dni which implies that any plant that exports its good will also sell it at home. Notice
t h a tt h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u e ,t h a ti s ,o n l yaf r a c t i o no fa c t i v ep l a n t sw i l ls u c c e d ei ne x p o r t i n ga n y w h e r e .
9row and ith column element given by ddni
dni , the percentage change in dni due to trade reforms
and diag(.) is an operator which transforms an N × N matrix into an N × 1 vector whose
elements are the elements of the diagonal of the matrix. With this equation we calculate the






[Mc(j) − (1 − β)] (2)
where Mc is the composite markup across all markets, i.e., total revenues over total costs.
Therefore a decrease in the price of intermediates implies a gain in eﬃciency. Since W is
kept ﬁxed by assumption, it also implies that real wages increase by the same proportion.
To study the eﬀect of two type of trade reforms on the manufacturing industry we study
the behavior of the model under two transformations of the D matrix. These two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the shock matrix represent i) a reduction in Chile’s trade barriers representing
changes occurred in the country by the end of the 70s and ii) a bilateral reduction in trade
barriers for the countries which recently signed trade agreements with Chile.
We study a fall in trade barriers, to represent the situation of Chile at the end of the
70s, by letting
ddcl,i
dcl,i = d1 for all i, where the index cl is the row corresponding to Chile in
the shock matrix D and d1 is the percentage reduction in trade barriers. To represent the
eﬀect of PTAs we set
ddi,j
di,j = d2 for i ∈ B and j ∈ B − {i},w h e r eB is the set of countries
participating to the PTA and d2 is the agreed tariﬀ reduction.
3.3 Calibration
To evaluate the quantitative importance of the predictions of the model we take it to the
data. The purpose of the calibration is to set the stage for analyzing how diﬀerent kinds of
trade shocks aﬀect the structure of the manufacturing s e c t o r .W eu s et h ef r a m e w o r ko u t l i n e d
in Section 3 which describes a global competition model among manufacturing industries
in diﬀerent countries. In this model, a fall in Chile’s trade barriers changes the relative
value of the competition inducing changes in the pattern of trade and performance of the
manufacturing sector in Chile.
In order to evaluate these changes we calibrate two parameters of the model as in BEJK.
We search for θ and σ in order to match the productivity and sales advantage of exporting
vs nonexporting plants observed in the ENIA dataset. To make the results comparable to
BEJK we calibrate the model for 1992 data. We use data on bilateral trade for Chile’s 43
10major trading partners9 from Feenstra (2000) and plant-level data from the ENIA. In our
sample of plant-level data from ENIA, exporters have, on average, 85 percent higher value
added per worker than nonexporters and their domestic shipments are on average 4.3 times
higher than those of nonexporting plants. We estimate θ, the parameter governing the degree
of heterogeneity in plants productivity, to be 2.85 and σ, the elasticity of substitution, to be
2.45, both values being smaller than those estimated by BEJK for the USA (θ =3 .6 and
σ =3 .79). Al o w e rv a l u eo fθ means higher productivity advantage of exporting plants which
is consistent with the estimated sample moments of Chile and US.
Table 3 shows, in detail, of how the data generated by the model compare with the statistics
observed in the data. Our results underpredict the fraction of exporting plants found in the
sample by 16 percent. This deviation is smaller as compared with BEJK who overpredict the
number of exporting plants by 30 percent.
The model matches quite well the skewness of the fraction of revenues from exports among
Chilean exporting plants. As in BEJK, most of exporters sell a small fraction abroad. However,
in our case we seem to perform better than BEJK for the higher percentiles of the distribution.
Finally, we obtain a standard deviation of the log of value added per worker of about 0.57
in the simulated data while in the actual sample is about 1.0. Indeed, these results seem to
suggest that the model’s ﬁt is capturing the main facts of the plant-level data.
4 Quantitative Analysis of Trade Reforms
In this section we study the quantitative implications of trade reforms using the calibrated
model presented in Section 3. We begin with an analysis of the eﬀects of the trade liber-
alization reforms that Chile experienced at the end of the 70s. We compare steady state
outcomes of a fall in trade barriers on diﬀerent indicators of the manufacturing industry.
Next we consider the potential beneﬁts of preferential trade agreements. We use the most
recent data available to us to estimate the eﬀects of eliminating the uniform nominal tariﬀ
rate with several trading blocks.
9Those countries represent about 95 percent of the total volume of exports from Chile.
114.1 Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization Reforms
In this subsection we report how the calibrated model responds to a fall in trade barriers of
similar magnitude to the one observed in Chile at the end of the 70s. For this experiment
we use the values of θ and σ obtained in Section 3. For the situation before and after the
tariﬀ reduction we use trade ﬂows, exports and production data for the thirty most important
trading partners of Chile in 1980.
We consider a uniform reduction in Chile’s trade barriers by 50 percent. As described in
Section 2, Chile’s eﬀective protection rate decreased by about 58 percent from 1977 to 1979.
Given that we use 1980 as our starting period and that the eﬀects of the reduction might
show up only after a positive time lag this seems a plausible scenario.
Table 4 summarizes the results of this experiment, showing the eﬀects of the trade policy
shock on the steady state of the model and comparing them with the data. While identifying
the eﬀects of trade reforms we have to take into account other major economic and political
events aﬀecting Chile during the 1980s and in particular the recession which hit the economy in
1982-83. Historical evidence from the pre-recession period 1980-81 can therefore be considered
as a good starting point to judge the "goodness of ﬁt" of the model. Reaching the new steady
state requires however more time and therefore we report, in Table 4, changes in various
statistics for two periods: from 1980 to 1981 and from 1980 to 1983.10 A c c o r d i n gt ot h e
model, a fall in barriers of 50 percent has large eﬀects on the eﬃciency and composition of
the manufacturing sector. Consistent with the theory we predict an increase of aggregate
productivity, measured as value added per worker, of 24.1 percent. In the data (see Panel A)
we ﬁnd that overall productivity actually rose by 9.7 percent from 1980 to 1981, declined from
1981 to 1982 as the recession hit the economy and rose again from 1982 to 1983, reaching
a level 23 percent higher than in 1980. Following the methodology outlined in Foster et al.
(2001), we decompose the change in aggregate productivity (qt+1−qt)f r o my e a rt to year t+1
into the contribution of exiting plants (x), entering plants (n), reallocation among surviving
plants (c) and productivity gains for continuing incumbents. Denoting the set of plants of
10Another reason for reporting statistics for the 1980-83 period is that Chile temporarily increased its tariﬀs
to 35% from the end of 1983 to mid 1985, when tariﬀs were reduced to 20%.
12each type as Ωk, k = n,x,c:
qt+1 − qt =
X
j∈Ωc
st(j)[qt+1(j) − qt(j)] +
X
j∈Ωc












where qt(j) is the period-t productivity of plant j as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 2 )a n dst(j) is
the period-t employment share of plant j as a fraction of total manufacturing employment.
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the decomposition for the model and the data.
According to the model, the increase in productivity is due to the combined eﬀects of four
factors. First, a 17.3 percent rise in the productivity of continuing plants which gain from a 21
percent decline in the price of intermediates goods (as cheaper imports replace domestically
produced inputs). The second factor is the change in the set of active plants: the number
of plants decreases by 19.5 percent and since exiting plants are on average 45 percent less
productive than nonexiting plants, overall productivity rises by another 6.2 percent. The third
factor is the reallocation of production among continuing plants which accounts for another
4.4 percent increase in overall productivity. Finally, as continuing plants expand and start
selling to new markets their average productivity advantage decreases and this accounts for
a decrease in overall productivity of 3.8 percent. The data, both for the period 1980-81 and
for the period 1980-83, seem to be consistent with these predictions in terms of sign and (for
the period 1980-83) levels. Moreover, the model also captures the relative importance of each
of the productivity components. Panel B of Table 4 reports the ratios between each of the
addends on the right-hand-side of equation (2) and the change in aggregate productivity (the
left-hand-side of equation (2)). As Pavnick (2002) suggested, both within plant productivity
improvements and the reshuﬄing of resources from less to more eﬃcient producers play a
role.
According to the theory, the number of plants decreases by 19.5 percent: these plants are
less eﬃcient than average and they tend to sell only in the domestic market. Table 4 and
Section 2 show that the number of plants in fact decreased by 12 percent from 1980 to 1981
and by 29 percent from 1980 to 1983. Given that the recession probably reinforced the exit
of less productive plants, the model seems to capture quite well this trend in the economy.
Exiting plants are about 70 percent less productive than nonexiting plants in 1980-81. The
model predicts a decrease in employment of 6.5 percent which describes quite well the actual
13trend in the short and medium period: a decrease of 8 percent between 1980 and 1981 and of
13 percent between 1980 and 1986. Furthermore, the relative importance of gross job creation
and destruction are also consistent with the data.11 Finally, the model suggests an increase in
exports by 68 percent and imports by 93 percent while actual data show a decrease in exports
and an increase in imports in the short run.
Overall the model seems to capture quite well the main changes in the manufacturing
sector after the trade reforms, showing a fair precision and ability to identify the relative
importance of diﬀe r e n tf a c t o r s .W i t ht h i si nm i n dw eu s et h em o d e l ,i nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,t o
analyze recent changes in the trade policy of Chile.
4.2 Potential Beneﬁts of Preferential Trade Agreements
In the past ﬁve years Chile has negotiated a series of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)
with its main trading partners. Since the year 2000 it has entered PTAs with United States,
the European Union, Korea and other European countries. According to Harrison et al (2001)
Chile has followed a policy of additive regionalism in which a country starts a process of nego-
tiating bilateral free trade agreements with all its important trading partners. Theoretically,
the eﬀects of entering PTAs are ambiguous and their beneﬁts are therefore a matter of em-
pirical analysis. Popular general equilibrium methods to evaluate trade policies are based
on scale economies and imperfect competition (Melo and Tarr,1992). We show that a global
competition model with a ricardian structure is also suitable for the analysis of trade policies.
We evaluate the eﬀects on the performance of the manufacturing sector in Chile of entering
PTAs with two important trading blocks, NAFTA and EU and with all the Chilean trading
partners. For this experiment we mantain the same values for the elasticity of substitution
σ and eﬃciency parameter θ obtained in Section 3. Now we use data for trade ﬂows and
production from 1996, as a way to account for the fact that Chile has increased the number
of countries with which it trades.
Table 5 depicts the eﬀects of two PTA scenarios on diﬀerent aspects of the manufacturing
industry. Changes are relative to Chile’s 1996 initial conditions. Scenario I represents the
results of bilaterally decreasing the tariﬀ rate from 11 percent to 6 percent with countries
11J o bc r e a t i o nf r o mp e r i o dt to period t+1is deﬁned as the sum of the number of workers of entering plants
and of the increase in the number of workers of continuing plants. Job destruction is deﬁned as the sum of
the number of workers of exiting plants and of the decrease in the number of workers of continuing plants.
14member of NAFTA and the European Union.12 According to our results a PTA leads to a 15
percent increase in productivity, measured as value added per worker, with a reduction in the
number of plants of 16 percent. As the price of intermediates are cheaper real wages decrease
by 13 percent. The net eﬀect on employment reaches 27 percent. The eﬀects of lower tariﬀs
are large in terms of the trade balance. Exports and imports increase by 222 percent and 129
percent respectively.
The second scenario, labelled global trade,r e p r e s e n t st h ee ﬀects of entering trade agree-
ments with all Chilean trading partners. We explore this scenario as a measure of the potential
gain (upper bound) of negotiating PTAs with all countries. Manufacturing plants gain 43 per-
cent in measured productivity mainly due to an increase in the productivity of continuing
ﬁrms. Manufacuring real wages increases by 42 percent. In relation to the previous scenario
we observe an increase in the net employment creation reaching 36 percent. Exports and im-
ports increase by 602 and 374 percent respectively. Our results suggest that the potential gain
of extending PTAs with Chile’s trading partners are large in terms of aggregated productivity
and employment.
We also calculated the change in government revenue as a result of the two scenarios.
Government revenue is calculated as the tariﬀ rate multiplied by the value of imports. Ac-
cording to our estimates government revenue rises by 25 percent in scenario I and by 159
percent in scenario II. The fact that the government gains from a reduction in tariﬀsi st h e
result of a large increase in imports in the experiment. A lower elasticity of subsbtitution,
which means a small demand response to price diﬀerence, will imply a lower sensitivity of
imports to changes in tariﬀ rates and a potentially negative impact on government revenues.
Other policy studies obtain goverment revenue losses and calculate replacement tax options,
in which the government levies taxes in order to compensate for the loss produced by the
reduction of tariﬀs (Harrison et-al, 2002). This type of analysis does not consider the reallo-
cations of resources that a global competition model delivers that may result in government
revenue increases as in our experiment.
Since the model presented in this section is stylized, the particular numbers oﬀered should
be seen as preliminary. A potential area of research should focus on improving the current
speciﬁcation to allow for other sectors in the economy as well as goverment. These extensions
may help to improve the estimation of the real welfare eﬀects of alternative trade options.
12We have chosen a reduction in nominal tariﬀ of 45 percent as in Harrison et-al (2001).
155C o n c l u s i o n s
Trade theory has recently recognized the importance of heterogeneity of individual producers.
Several potential explanations have been provided to account for plant-level facts mainly in
developed countries. In this paper we use the model developed by BEJK to explain several
plant-level facts for a small developing economy. Our ﬁndings indicates that a model of global
competition is also consistent with several features of the Chilean manufacturing sector.
We use a calibrated version to revisit an issue that had previously been studied using
partial competitive equilibrium models. We study the eﬀects of a trade shock similar to what
Chile experienced in its trade reforms at the end of the 70s.
The model proves to be able to account for the main developments in the manufacturing
sector and, in particular, is able to predict the eﬀect of trade opening on the diﬀerent compo-
nents of aggregate productivity. It also account fairly well for several indicators of entry-exit
and employment with a reasonable level of accuracy.
Finally, we also use the model to explore the eﬀects of preferential trade agreements on
the performance of the manufacturing industry. We ﬁnd evidence of potentially large beneﬁts
for Chile of negotiating PTAs with its main trading partners.
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18Appendix A: The Price Equation
BEJK show that the joint distribution of the lowest cost C1n and second-lowest cost C2n
of supplying some good to country n is:










is a cost parameter that summarizes the eﬀect of the absolute and comparative advantage
parameters, the cost of the inputs and the trade barriers around the world.
To derive the eﬀect of a trade shock on the price of intermediates, refer to equation (1)















using pi = γΦ
−1/θ
i twice, which represents the exact price index in country i under the
assumption σ<1+θ and where φi = γθβTiW
−θβ
i and γ is a function of θ and σ.






















































Now, we can rearrange terms as:











19and switch to matrix notation
[In − (1 − β)Π]dlogΘ = −θdiag(ΠD0)
dlogΘ = −θ[In − (1 − β)Π]
−1 diag(ΠD0) (a1)
where Θ is an N × 1 vector whose representative element is Φn, Π is an N × N matrix
whose representative element is πni, D is an N ×N matrix where the representative element
ddni
dni is the percentage change in country n trade barriers versus country i and diag(.) is an
operator which transform an N × N matrix into an N × 1 vector whose elements are the






we can rewrite equation (a1) as:
dlogP =[ In − (1 − β)Π]
−1 diag(ΠD0)
Appendix B: Data Sources
Our empirical work combines macro-level data on world bilateral trade ﬂows and gross pro-
duction in the manufacturing sector with micro-level data on Chilean manufacturing plants.
The latter has been described in Section 2.13 Trade data come from the World Trade Ana-
lyzer (WTA) database assembled by Statistics Canada which contains bilateral trade ﬂows for
all countries over 1980-1997, classiﬁed according to a 34 manufacturing industry basis used
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (Feenstra (2000)). Data on gross production for
the manufacturing sector comes from OECD (STAN dataset), UNIDO and World Develop-
ment Indicators. Real value of output is computed by using an industry level price deﬂator
constructed by the Banco Central de Chile. Real values of the other variables are obtained
by using, in most cases, 3-digits sector speciﬁcd e ﬂators derived directly from the plant-level
dataset.
13We refer the reader to Liu (1993) for a more comprehensive description of the plant data.
20Table 1: Eﬀective Protection in Chile, 1974-1979
Eﬀective Protection (%)
ISIC Industries 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
312 Food 161 105 48 28 16 12
313 Beverages 203 119 47 32 19 13
314 Tobacco 114 68 29 19 11 11
321 Textiles 239 138 74 49 28 14
323 Leather Products 181 98 46 36 21 13
322/324 Footwear and apparel 264 164 71 48 27 14
331 Wood products 157 93 45 28 16 15
3 3 2 F u r n i t u r e 9 55 82 81 71 11 1
341 Paper and paper products 184 114 62 37 22 17
3 4 2 P r i n t i n g 1 4 07 54 03 22 01 2
355 Rubber products 49 55 54 43 26 15
351/352 Chemicals 80 53 45 24 16 13
353/354 Petroleum 265 101 17 0 12 13
369 Non-metallic minerals 128 87 55 32 20 14
371 Iron and steel 127 86 64 38 25 17
381 Metal products 147 101 77 52 27 15
382 Non-electric machinery 96 72 58 35 19 13
383 Electric machinery 96 72 58 35 19 13
384 Transport equipment - - - - --
390 Miscellaneous - - - - - -
Mean 151.4 92.2 51 32.5 19.7 13.61
Standard deviation 60.4 29.4 15.7 12.5 5.3 1.7
R a n g e 2 1 6 1 1 1 6 05 21 7 6
Source: Aedo and Lagos (1984)
21Table 2: Entry and Exit Variables for the Chilean Manufacuring Sector (Averages over all
3-digits Sectors)
1980-82 1983-85 1986-88 1989-91 1992-94 1995-96
Entrant Rate (ER)
.006 .026 .055 .048 .071 .160
Entrant Market Share (ESH)
Number of Workers .006 .014 .027 .025 .034 .072
Output .003 .005 .019 .010 .015 .032
Entrant Relative Size (ERS)
Number of Workers .842 .531 .538 .532 .490 .498
Output .401 .205 .399 .216 .207 .219
Exiter Rate (XR)
.130 .073 .044 .022 .018 .026
Exiter Market Share (XSH)
Number of Workers .074 .032 .02 .011 .013 .015
Output .035 .012 .006 .006 .006 .010
Exiter Relative Size (XRS)
Number of Workers .538 .409 .467 .494 .697 .566
Output .240 .153 .136 .258 .335 .386
Notes: the statistics are calculated using all 3-digits industry sectors but we drop entering plants
if their output is greater than 3 standard deviations times the mean output of entering plants to
eliminate outliers. See Dunne et al. (1989) for details on how to calculate entry/exit statistics.
Table 3: Chile’s Export Facts: Simulated and Actual Data, 1992
Percentage of all plants
Export status Simulated Actual
No exports 94.8 80.1
Some exports 5.2 19.6
Export Intensity of exporters Percentage of
exporting plants
Simulated Actual
0 to 10 69.2 53.78
10 to 20 11.1 10.31
20 to 30 1.1 5.51
30 to 40 7.1 4.90
40 to 50 6.1 3.27
50 to 60 1.7 5.00
60 to 70 1.4 4.29
70 to 80 1.4 6.43
80 to 90 0.5 3.88
90 to 100 0 2.65
22Table 4: Eﬀects of Trade Refoms: 50 Percent Reduction in Chile’s Trade Barriers
Model 1980-81 1980-83
Panel A: Main Statistics (Percentage Changes)
Industry
Aggregate Productivity 24.1 9.7 21.0
continuing plants 17.3 6.5 16.5
entering plants 0 0 -.1
exiting plants 6.2 3.5 9.4
reallocation among continuing plants 4.4 2.1 2.9
cross term for continuing plants -3.8 -2.4 -6.7
Number of Plants -19.5 -12 -28.7
Relative Productivity of Exiters 55 30 20.9
Employment
Change in total employment -6.5 -8 -26
Gross job ﬂows: created 14.7 7.1 17.2
Gross job ﬂows: destroyed 21.2 15.5 43.5
Trade
Chile exports 68.3 -26 -33.8
Chile imports 93.4 33 -49.2
Panel B: Relative Importance of Productivity Components
Continuing plants .72 .67 .79
Entering plants 0 -.04 -.05
Exiting plants .26 .36 .45
Reallocation among continuing plants .18 .22 .14
Cross term for continuing plants -.16 -.25 -.32
Total 1 1 1
Notes: Panel A) on each row, except for "Relative Productivity of Exiters", we report
the predicted percentage change in the relevant statistic under the column "model"
and the actual percentage change from 1980 to 1981 and from 1980 to 1983
in the last two columns; "Relative Productivity of Exiters" refers to the average
value added per worker of exiting plants with respect to nonexiting plants: the
second column contains the model prediction while the last two columns contain
the 1980-81,1980-1983 average actual relative productivity.
23Table 5: Eﬀects of Two Alternative PTAs on Industrial and Trade Outcomes (percent changes)
Scenario I Scenario II
(NAFTA, EU)-Chile Global Trade
Industry
Aggregated Productivity 15.1 43
Plan exiting 16.0 20
Real wages 13.4 43.9
Employment
Change in total employment 27.9 36
Gross job ﬂows: created 48.5 60.4
Gross job ﬂows: destroyed 20.6 23.1
Trade
Chile exports 222 662















































Figure 1: Number of Plants in the Survey, Number of Plants Dropped and Number of Plants
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Figure 3: Ratio of Plant Labor Productivity to Overall Mean: Exporters vs. Non-exporters,
1992
25